takes' to save the euro -appear to have brought an end to the mood of impending doom regarding the future of the EU. For many observers and commentators, however, any sense of crisis receding needs to be tempered. Whereas in Ireland and Portugal post-bailout austerity-based reforms appear, at the time of writing, to be bearing fruit, Greece remains in crisis and the prospect of 'Grexit' rather than receding is no longer regarded as unacceptable and to be avoided at all costs. Moreover, containing and resolving the eurozone crisis is a question of addressing not only immediate causes, notably sovereign debt, but also the structural shortcomings of and indeed flaws in the design of the eurozone and the wider process of economic and monetary union (EMU). Furthermore, crisis can not only beget new crises but also expose or intensify existing crises. And this is certainly the view of some of the more provocative assessments of the EU produced in recent years. For Zielonka, the EU's days as the primary focus for, and vehicle of, European integration are numbered; the EU is destined to become 'toothless and useless' (Zielonka, 2014, p. 106 ).
The books under review here each, albeit to varying degrees, accept that the EU has recently been experiencing -and in many respects continues to experience -a multiplicity of crises. The eurozone crisis has been the most potent and energy-sapping. Pre-dating it, yet also exacerbated by it, are crises of legitimacy, leadership, accountability, purpose and democratic deficit. To this may be added crises of (mis)understanding, of interdependence and of identity. Whether, how and to what extent the EU can continue to weather and overcome these crises is where the books differ. For Majone, the future is very bleak. The other authors are rightly less pessimistic. The EU has its flaws, but as even the eurozone crisis has shown, it can act and adapt. The issue for Copsey, Peet and LaGuardia and McCormick is that some serious rethinking and further reform are necessary.
Peet and LaGuardia focus on the eurozone crisis, a crisis to which The Economist, for which both authors write, has dedicated considerable editorial space and not an insignificant number of characteristically provocative front covers (which the book conveniently reproduces). For Peet and LaGuardia, the euro, in the face of the financial storm caused by the collapse of subprime mortgages in the United States and the ensuing credit crunch 'turned out to be a flimsy umbrella that flopped over in the wind and dragged away many of the weaker economies [and] led to the worst economic crisis in Europe since the end of the second world war' (p. xi). The crisis was so bad that 'Europe became the world's basket case' with the 'Europhiles and Eurosceptics alike' exhibiting a growing belief that the euro had 'undermined, and may yet destroy the European Union' (p. xii).
Readers of Unhappy Europe looking for a lively account of the eurozone crisis delivered in a punchy journalistic style will not be disappointed. The authors chart key developments in the crisis, working through the events that culminated in bailouts for Greece, Ireland and Portugal and the establishment of the ESM and the adoption of the Fiscal Compact Treaty, and also place the crisis in the broader context of the EU's development. Consequently, they highlight both the institutional design flaws of EMU and the euro and reflect on key turning points in the crisis and its significance for the balance of power in the EU. The analysis is well presented; it will also be familiar to those who followed the crisis: 2012 was a key year with Angela Merkel's commitment to keeping Greece in the euro and Draghi's 'whatever it takes' 'announcement in August -'Draghi's great bluff' (p. xv); the crisis firmly established Germany as the predominant power in the EU; and the whole saga exposed tensions between eurozone 'ins' and 'outs', notably the United Kingdom.
Peet and LaGuardia also explore what the eurozone crisis reveals about the EU more generally covering the EU's crisis of legitimacy, its democratic deficit, the short-termism of EU leaders and their limited capacity to solve the eurozone crisis and address its economic and political fallout. The crisis has, however, demonstrated resolve: '[EU] leaders have shown they will act to avoid imminent shipwreck. This means a sudden catastrophic default and currency redenomination is improbable' (p. 175). They are probably right; the EU has moved into calmer waters and shown that it can, however cumbersomely and laboriously, address at least some of the symptoms and causes of the crisis.
However, despite the apparent calm, further episodes in the crises cannot be ruled out. Indeed, Unhappy Union anticipates further crisis: banks remain 'wobbly' despite new supervisory mechanisms; the ECB's bluff could be called if and when doubts about its commitment to intervene intensify; the legal status of Outright Monetary Transactions continues to be challenged; and economic stagnation persists with growth slow and unemployment high. Moreover, there are important political challenges facing the EU. Two in particular are highlighted: the increased popular disaffection with the EU that has led to increased support for and been promoted by anti-EU and antiimmigration parties 1 ; and the possibility of a UK exit from the EU. All these are perfectly sound observations.
The fact that the EU has very much 'muddled through' the eurozone crisis offers little hope to the Unhappy Union's authors that EU leaders -'not proven to be endowed with long-term vision' (p.
177) -will ever pursue a bolder, radical transformation of the EU into a more integrated political and economic union. So, 'the best that can probably be hoped for is that the eurozone lurches from one crisis-induced reform to another', a state of affairs that will be 'unnecessarily costly and painful, but might somehow lead to a more coherent and workable system' (p. 177). The alternative is that the EU runs the risk that 'one or all of its members lose the will to preserve the single currency, and perhaps the wider project ' (p. 177 providing a label by which Europeans might better understand and measure the work of the EU, assuaging the fears of those who oppose further integration, and minimizing opportunities for the works of the EU to be misrepresented' (p. 150). However, simply conceptualizing the EU as a confederation cannot -and must not -in any way be regarded as a panacea for the EU's ills. These ills need to be recognized, which McCormick does. So, the EU has to: engage its citizens; reform its institutions to make them more democratic, more transparent and more efficient; be more responsive; complete unfinished business; and simplify and adjust the division of competences between the Member States and the supranational level. Much can be achieved by proceeding pragmatically, by drawing breath, and by 'deepening rather than widening, allowing the European project to settle, allowing time for its flaws to be worked out in a considered fashion unpolluted by scepticism, pessimism, myths, misunderstandings and crises' (p. 151).
McCormick points to the Laeken Declaration of 2001 as a blueprint for how the EU might proceed.
Much maligned, Laeken was supposed to 'mark a decisive step towards a simpler Union, one that is stronger in the pursuit of its essential objectives and more present in the world' (Council of the European Union, 2001: point 3) and launch a debate on how the EU's institutions could be brought closer to its citizens and how the EU should engage with a fast-changing globalised world. Such challenges still exist; and many of the questions set out in the Laeken Declaration still need to be answered. Re-engaging with Laeken -or better still a revised set of questions reflecting the challenges and issues highlighted by McCormick and the other volumes under review -could be a useful exercise, particularly if second time around a genuine and informed 'future of Europe' debate could be generated. Organizing such a debate would be a major challenge not least because Member
States, the key interlocutors between citizens and the supranational level are notoriously disinclined, if at all able, to generate debate on European integration. An informed debate needs to be had in the EU if it is to re-establish itself as an entity and process that enjoys broad popular support.
Neither Majone nor Copsey, both of whom set about 'rethinking' the EU in the light of the eurozone crisis, explicitly share McCormick's interest in revisiting the Laeken Declaration. Neither mentions it.
Given Majone's analysis, there would probably be little point, for essentially European integration has simply gone too far and it is time to revert to a 'club of clubs' (p. 321). Post-crisis Europe therefore needs greater flexibility in terms of its political organization; it needs to be something other than
European integration as 'a simple linear extrapolation of the traditional nation state model' (p. 321).
Indeed, for Majone, there is a need to question 'the very nature and the aims of the integration process' (p. 316). And this is not merely a consequence of the eurozone crisis, but rather the fundamentally flawed design of the EU and nature of EU-based integration. The EU's 'collective leadership' modus operandi is severely limited in what it can achieve, and the 'total absence of the traditional government-opposition dialectic' -a major problem for the EU as Copsey also notesmeans that 'nobody can claim to govern the EU' (p. 14). Moreover, the EU has long-suffered from a significant mismatch between what it promises and what it has delivered. The failure of monetary union to deliver the anticipated economic benefits is particularly serious: its visibility is much greater and its effects are much more widely felt than anything previously. The political consequences of a failure therefore threaten to be far more significant.
For Majone, the EU, whose 'ever-widening and deepening integration process has proved impotent to arrest the decline of Europe's economy relative to its major competitors' (p. 16), needs to be fundamentally reconsidered. His challenging analysis, elements of which will be familiar to readers of his earlier works (e.g. Majone, 2009) , is therefore less a focus on the most recent period of eurozonedominated crisis, more a forthright and trenchant criticism of the way in which the EU is structured and has evolved and of significant elements of academic analysis (notably neofunctionalism This is all highly provocative and intentionally so. Majone's fierce criticism of EU integration raises important questions about how far integration has progressed and the form it has taken. This is a very thought-provoking and intellectually stimulating book and Majone's diagnosis of the problems and challenges facing European integration should not be ignored. Important questions are raised.
However, one cannot but help thinking that some of the core claims are overstated. Majone talks of a 'race towards deeper integration' (p. 303). Europe over the last sixty years has certainly experienced a process of deepening integration; but to view it as a 'race' is to ignore the piecemeal manner in which it has been achieved, the hard bargaining and negotiation that has been necessary, and the more federalist and integrationist ambitions that have been dashed along the way. There are serious problems with the eurozone's 'one-size-fits-all' monetary policy and the design of monetary union more generally; but the history of the EU is one of seeking to address and resolve problems that integration has raised and incrementally adapt the EU accordingly. This has generally worked to date, and the fact that the EU has emerged from the eurozone crisis essentially intact, if battered, bruised and weary, suggests that the model remains durable and broadly supported, at least at the elite level.
Even at the popular level, Eurobarometer polls consistently reveal marginally greater trust in the EU compared to national parliaments and governments (European Commission, 2014, p. 8) . This is not to dispute in any way the need for reform, or the pressing need to address the EU's legitimacy and democratic deficits. Insights and ideas can be taken from Majone's analysis, but there appears little need to take up his call of effectively returning to the drawing board with how integration is pursued, abandoning the EU as we know it, and pursuing integration in a radically difficult manner. Moreover, one has to question how feasible this would be politically. The appetite -as with the case of fullblown political union -simply does not exist. Furthermore, the whole case tends to ignore the increasingly differentiated nature of EU-based integration; the flexibility that Majone is calling for, partly exists already, and there is scope for more, provided fundamental principles are not compromised. provides a well-argued reminder that, even as it appears to be putting the darkest days of the eurozone crisis behind it, the EU is still faced with significant challenges that need to be addressed if it is to survive as a purposeful contributor to economic, political and social development in Europe.
Copsey explores four specific challenges in detail. The first concerns the question of who actually identifies with the EU. The answer, beyond a broadly enthusiastic elite, is relatively few people. At best there is a grudging popular acceptance of the EU by a generally apathetic majority. Whether this will be sufficient to sustain the EU is rightly questioned, particularly as integration, its cost and benefits become increasingly contested. Second, there is the related issue of the EU's popular legitimacy. Here Copsey notes the EU's long-standing democratic deficit, yet is quick to point out that it is less severe than its most ardent critics maintain and that democracy has its shortcomings at the level of Member States as well. He also makes the important point that the situation is exacerbated by the culture of consensus-building in the EU which tends to deny voters real choices. Compounding matters is the elite-determined response to the eurozone crisis which has seen austerity imposed without popular approval. Consequently, and here Copsey and Majone concur, the EU has arguably Like Majone, Copsey is strong on identifying and diagnosing problems and challenges. Whereas
Majone very much sees the EU glass as half empty at best, Copsey is rightly more positive, having at least some faith in the proven durability of the established structures. However, as he also notes, the need for change has to be recognized; and this has to be accompanied by greater regard for the future.
Short-termism needs to be overcome and more strategic thinking needs to be deployed. If socioeconomic decline is to be addressed, reform is needed across the EU and not just in the bailout states -Greece, Cyprus, Portugal and Ireland -or those that have struggled -e.g. Spain and Italy -to service and reduce their sovereign debt. Copsey points particularly to France, which still has to come to terms with globalization and reform and can presumably act as a model for reform elsewhere. surely time for national institutions to catch up with Europe's political reality as a polity-in-themaking' (p. 220). To this should be added the point that governments and electorates need to accept and promote national and EU levels of policy-making as being part of the same evolving 'European' political system.
Copsey's diagnosis of Europe's problems and his calls for change are well-made and are followed by a concluding, albeit unfortunately rather brief, discussion of the 'choices' Europe has to make. Three are identified: a 'new project, narrative or vision for Europe'; the means to deliver effectively at national and EU level; and a decision on how far the 'new project' will extend. For the first, historical narratives of peace and prosperity need to be supplemented with a narrative of 'European values' and of 'unity in strength', and a shared sense of a 'common purpose' for the EU. A range of ideas are floated: addressing Europe's ageing population, increasing economic productivity, increasing labour market participation, and ensuring long-term investment in energy and power generation, research and development, education and training. In order for this to be done, a debate needs to be had on the model of free markets the EU will promote. In terms of delivery, Copsey is brief, pointing to the need for political will and robust and modernized institutions well-resourced financially and in terms of human capital. On the delineation of the EU's borders, he is briefer and inconclusive; essentially a case of 'time will tell'. The conclusion to this ambitious book with its authoritative discussion of issues, informed analysis of where the EU is and its attempt to 'rethink' the EU, unfortunately, rather tails off.
That the EU needs a 'new project, narrative or vision for Europe' is hard to dispute; the EU has to reassert its sense of purpose. Copsey's call raises the question, however, of who in the EU can -and should -provide the necessary leadership. Few informed observers can deny that Member State governments must take a leading role here. They are not only the key drivers of integration, but they continue to be the primary means through which citizens, increasingly affected by integration, involve Puetter and co-authors elsewhere (see Bickerton et al, 2014) , all these policies are 'governed less intergovernmentally now than in the pre-Maastricht era' (Schimmelfennig, 2015, p. 4 whether the full set of claims for a 'new' distinctive intergovernmentalism can actually be sustained is arguably overstated. In addition to the observations above, it also tends to downplay the support that has existed among at least some Member States for more supranationally-oriented reforms regarding banking, fiscal and even economic union -even if banking union so far is a lot more intergovernmental than some hoped for -and the fact that moves beyond intergovernmental policy coordination cannot be ruled out.
A final comment on The European Council and the Council relates to 'deliberative intergovernmentalism', Puetter's 'umbrella term' for an analytical framework 'which holds that the EU's dependency on permanent consensus generation among Member State governments in day-today policy-making … determines intergovernmental decision-making'. It predicts that 'institutional engineering will occur in all spheres of European Council and Council decision-making ' (p. 5) . This is all demonstrated in detail based on a set of theoretically-grounded -but equally, empiricallydeducible -propositions in regard to a selection of policy areas. The latter is important since the claims Puetter is making about deliberative intergovernmentalism relate only to the EU's 'new areas of activity'; there are considerable areas of more supranational EU activity and certain Council activity where the case for deliberative intergovernmentalism is not being advanced. This important caveat to Puetter's analysis and argument should not be overlooked.
Although not its purpose The European Council and the Council does show how, in part at least, the EU institutionally has been responding to the eurozone crisis and reveals the continuously evolving nature and structures of the two institutions covered. Their flexibility and adaptability will provide some comfort to those who maintain the EU is able to adjust in the face of crisis and survive.
Advocates of supranationalism and those nostalgic for the heyday of community-method domination of EC policy-making will be dismayed, however, at yet further well-documented evidence of sustained and increasingly institutionalised intergovernmentalism within the EU.
Whether this intergovernmentalism enhances the EU's capacity to take up the reform challenges set out by the authors of the other volumes under review here remains to be seen. There will be doubters;
boldness and decisiveness and the setting aside of short-term political considerations in favour of longer-term principles and the interests of the EU, its citizens and integration have not always been the hallmarks of responses to the eurozone crisis or indeed other previous crises and challenges. A tendency towards muddling through is the norm in the EU and is likely, on the basis of evidence to date, and as Peet and LaGuardia argue, to remain so despite the urgings of McCormick and others for the EU to be bolder and more decisive. Puetter's stress on deliberative intergovernmentalism and consensus-building also conspires against swift and ambitious action. Yet, used effectively a more deliberative response can have its advantages, providing opportunities to reflect, consider and take informed decisions. It also provides scope -regrettably often ignored -to engage wider interests in the process of formulating responses. The challenge for the EU is to take those opportunities and use that scope.
It will need to if the underlying problems challenges identified by Copsey in particular are to be addressed and in a manner that does not exacerbate the EU's existing democratic and legitimacy deficits. These have become critical and further attempts to deepen integration significantly without effective public consultation and endorsement are likely not only to fail but also to undermine irreversibly the prospect of embedding broad popular support for the EU. For such a consultation to take place, honest assessments of the EU and integration are essential. What unites each of the volumes under review is their informed reflections on the state of the EU and the manifold problems and challenges it faces. They demonstrate quite clearly that the eurozone crisis is not the only crisis facing the EU and even its resolution -far from an assured outcome -will not see an end to crisis.
Yet the persistence of crisis is no reason to abandon either integration or the EU. There is demonstrable resilience and a capacity to respond in the EU, even if crisis responses may often seem and be sub-optimal and tardy. While Majone would not be alone in assuming otherwise, Copsey,
McCormick, Peet and LaGuardia all at least hope, if not believe, that the EU can adapt further to address the crises facing it. It goes without saying that moving the EU into a settled, supported and sustained future requires the complex range of problems diagnosed here to be addressed. A key question is whether the EU in its current or a reformed state has the capacity to do so. Its resilience through crisis to date suggests it probably does.
